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in central Athens where more weapons were discovered, including the ori-
Revolutionary Organization November 17 133
ginal 1911 .45 caliber pistol. 17N s 27-year-long violent campaign was
about to come to an end.
Analysis
Due to its ritualistic reliance on specific weapons, reverse escalation pattern,
repetitive attacks on selected targets, and the almost unchanging nature of
its modus operandi, 17N counts as one of the most conservative terrorist
organizations in history. The ritualistic close-quarter assassinations with the
.45 caliber weapon that made the group famous in the late 1970s remained
in its arsenal for the entire 27 years of the group s duration, and in essence
became a symbolic method to which the group would turn as a reconcili-
ation tool after failed operations or public opinion setbacks. Other ritualistic
aspects of 17N s modus operandi include the use of the same typewriter to
write the group s communiqués for over 20 years,504 and the format and
writing style of these communiqués, which made their authentification pos-
sible even without the use of a codeword. A further interesting pattern with
regard to 17N communiqués was the fact that the group would always claim
responsibility for three or four attacks at once, making the absence of an
immediate claim following an armed operation a clear sign of the inevitabil-
ity of further action.
Overall, 17N operations showed very little innovativeness, documented
by abundance of relatively clear and predictable patterns. The only major
technological shifts in the group s 27-year-long history included the enrich-
ment of the group s close-quarter assassination methods by the introduction
of explosive devices ten years into the campaign (1985), and then the incor-
poration of rocket attacks another six years later (1991). The reasons behind
17N s strikingly conservative approach to innovation will be explored in the
next section, where the variables hypothesized earlier to be the key factors
influencing the level of terrorists innovation will be tested in order to
provide a control study of their relevance to innovative organizations covered
earlier.
Role of ideology and strategy
17N s ideology and strategic outlook played a significant role in reinforcing
the group s conservative nature, in the sense that the group did not have an
ambition to govern and thus maintained an unusually low level of strategic
urgency with regards to the question of a final victory. On the one hand
17N s ideology has often been described as radical leftist, and the organi-
zation has openly traced its system to the teachings of Marx, Lenin and
Guevara. But despite describing itself as a  vanguard of the working class,
17N has differed significantly from most of its European revolutionary coun-
terparts in several important aspects. First, it had never attempted to turn
into a mass movement that would initiate a socialist revolution at the
134 Revolutionary Organization November 17
national level  a critical precondition of the formation of a communist
international organization that would install a socially just society around
the world. Second, 17N had no documented contacts with other European
groups such as the German RAF, the Italian Red Brigades or the French
Direct Action, and had not actively sought the support of a state sponsor
from the bloc countries under Soviet influence. Third, 17N did not have an
ambition to govern, nor did it seek to develop cadres for the purposes of
taking over government posts in the event of a successful revolution. These
factors are critical to understanding the reasons behind the fact that 17N has
been able to outlast other European revolutionary organizations  its resis-
tance to expansion of its ranks greatly limited the possibility of infiltration
by law enforcement, and the absence of sponsorship by states decreased
detection by foreign intelligence agencies. The final aspect that made 17N
unique was the fact that the group seemed to have no coherent revolutionary
strategy for mobilizing the masses, but instead limited its actions to aveng-
ing what the group saw as exploitation or injustice.505 The group in essence
sought the image of a Robin Hood-like mystical force, which acted as a
symbolic  instrument of popular justice, providing very specific explana-
tions of the logic behind every individual attack. One striking aspect of 17N
is its historical reluctance to launch attacks in the absence of a clear justifica-
tion for action. This aspect is quite unusual in the realm of terrorist organi-
zations, most of which have an inherent need to carry on with the
momentum of violent action even in the absence of a specific motive. In con-
trast, 17N (at least in the early period of its existence) has been willing to
lay down arms when the group s perceptions did not warrant action, as in
the case of the years after the PASOK electoral victory in 1981. Encouraged
by the party s socialist program, 17N ceased its armed operations for 25
months.
Further, 17N s lack of innovation seems to be closely correlated with the
group s strategy. First, due to the absence of an ambition to govern, the
group was not dependent on popular support and thus did not need to
impress a large audience. Second, since the group limited itself to mere acts
of revenge and ultimately did not take any specific action to bring about a
change in the status quo, there seems to have been only a very limited sense
of urgency in terms of the immediate necessity to spark a popular revolu-
tion. Both of the above factors clearly translated into 17N s apparent lack of
a need to escalate its violent campaign as a trigger of the revolutionary
involvement of the masses. In the absence of the need to escalate the group
had little motivation to invent new, more effective and more eye-catching
tactics, confirming the original hypothesis that organizations with vaguely
defined goals, low sense of urgency and a low level of strategic planning
would demonstrate lesser inclination toward innovation than organizations
whose ideology identifies an ideal outcome with regards to definite object-
ives, and which prescribes a time frame and a specific course of action for
reaching those objectives.
Revolutionary Organization November 17 135
Dynamics of the struggle
Defined as the distinction between guerilla vs. urban warfare and high vs.
low frequency of engagement, the  dynamics of the struggle is another
variable that shows a high level of relevance in terms of determining 17N s
conservative nature. 17N operated in an urban environment, having carried
out the absolute majority of its attacks in Athens. This geographical focus of
17N s campaign is especially apparent in the case of the group s close-
quarter assassination attacks, which have all occurred along a line centered
on Kiffisias Avenue, covering an area of a mere 15 2 kilometers. Along
this line were two particular clusters of attack points506 with the theft of
vehicles used in the attacks occurring in two areas on either side of the
line.507 This breakdown clearly demonstrates how the group s operations in
hit and run attacks were confined to a small area with which the group s
members were familiar enough to escape under pressure, and where a [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]