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led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and
desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes
them.
Proof. Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more
power in restraining emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as
equally great (IV. v. and iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking
fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.
DEFINITIONS. 26
 ETHICS PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
Corollary. The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage
or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
Note. What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in (III. lix. note). By danger I
mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours
from them.
Proof. Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant
man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated
less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only, desires to join other men to him in
friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself
and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires
rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.
Note. I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could
afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from
them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining
favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from
avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to
avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.
Proof. Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest
necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv. and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to
confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one to another.
Q.E.D.
Note. The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining
or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as
it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, He who, by reason of his
folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of
a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such
an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general
hurt.
PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudently, but always in good faith.
Proof. If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself
from the danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to
deceive? This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade
all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to
unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd.
PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general
system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]