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136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
tion was not all that complicated, that the
army was in control of everything, and so
forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion
that their position was under control.
KIRILENKO. In short, judging from
the report of Amin, the leadership of Af-
ghanistan is not experiencing the slightest
anxiety in connection with these events.
GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said
that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine.
He said that not a single incident of insub-
ordination by a governor had been reported,
that is, that all of the governors were on the
side of the lawful government. Whereas in
reality, according to the reports of our com-
rades, the situation in Herat and in a num-
ber of other places is alarming, and the in-
surgents are in control there.
As far as Kabul is concerned, the situ-
ation there is basically calm. The borders
of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are
closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A
large number of Afghans, formerly work-
ing in Iran, have been expelled from Iran
and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied,
and many of them have also joined up with
the insurgents.
The measures that we have drawn out
for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in
the proposals that you have in front of you.
I should add that we have appropriated an
additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan
in hard currency for the protection of the
border.
Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is
the principal place from which the terror-
ists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would
appear to follow that the leadership of Af-
ghanistan should send a letter of protest to
Pakistan or issue a declarations; in a word,
to come out with some kind of written state-
ment. However, the Afghan leadership has
not done that. To be sure, it looks very
strange.
I asked Amin, what kind of actions do
you consider necessary from our side? I told
him what kind of aid we might be able to
render. But he had no other requests, he sim-
ply responded that he had a very optimistic
appraisal of the circumstances in Afghani-
stan, that the help you have given will stand
us in good stead, and that all of the prov-
inces are safely under the control of lawful
forces. I asked him, don’t you expect any
problems from neighboring governments or
a domestic counter-revolution, and so forth?
Amin answered firmly that no, there are no
threats to the regime. In conclusion, he con-
veyed his greetings to the members of the
Politburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev.
And thus was my discussion today with
Amin.
After a short time, approximately two
or three hours, we received news from our
comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat.
One regiment, as I already indicated an ar-
tillery one, fired on its own troops, and part
of the second regiment went over to the in-
surgents. Consequently, only a portion of
the 17th division, which is guarding Herat,
remains loyal to the Government. Our com-
rades also tell us that tomorrow and the next
day, new masses of insurgents, trained on
the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may in-
vade.
About a half hour later, we again re-
ceived news from our comrades that Com-
rade Taraki had summoned the chief mili-
tary advisor Comrade Gorelov and charge
d’affaires Alekseev. And what did they dis-
cuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed
to the Soviet Union for help in the form of
military equipment, ammunition, and ra-
tions, that which is envisioned in the docu-
ments which we have presented for consid-
eration by the Politburo. As far as military
equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost
in passing, that perhaps ground and air sup-
port would be required. This must be un-
derstood to mean that the deployment of our
forces is required, both land and air forces.
In my opinion, we must proceed from
a fundamental proposition in considering the
question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: un-
der no circumstances may we lose Afghani-
stan. For 60 years now we have lived with
Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And
if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns
against the Soviet Union, this will result in
a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]